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Equilibrium prices in economies 
with indivisible goods and money.
Jos AM Potters
Abstract  The aim  of the  paper is twofold. The first more theoretical p a rt pro­
vides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stable price equilibria in 
economies w ith indivisible goods, m oney and quasi-linear u tility  functions. I t is an 
extension of a result of B ikhchandani and M am er (1997). I t also gives a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a core allocation to  be a price equilibrium . The second p a rt of 
the  paper is more algorithm ic. I t gives a m ethod to  com pute equilibrium  prices and 
to  check the conditions of the first p art. I t uses the  ‘nucleolus’ concept, a well known 
solution rule for TU-games.
Key words: (stable) price equilibrium , stochastic redistribution , regular price vector, 
nucleolus.
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E q u ilib r iu m  p rices  in  eco n o m ies  w ith  in d iv is ib le  g o o d s  and  m on ey .
I n t r o d u c t io n
Among economists it is widely believed th a t “finite TU-games do not m a tte r for eco­
nomic theory” . In th is paper, however, we prove th a t the  nucleolus, a m ajor solution 
concept in the theory  of TU-games, can be used very elegantly to  determ ine equi­
librium  prices and core allocations in economies w ith indivisible goods and money 
and— w hat is called—quasi-linear u tility  functions
The economies we consider in th is paper have the following features:
•  There is a finite set of agents N , n  =  \N\ and i , j ,  k , . . .  G N .
•  There is a finite set of indivisible goods Q, q =  \Q\ and a, ß , Y , . . .  G Q.
•  Each agent i G N  has an initial endowment  (Ai , m i ); A i Ç Q denotes the set of 
indivisible goods initially  hold by agent i and m i >  0 is the  am ount of m oney agent i 
has in the beginning. We assume th a t { A i } i^N is a distribution of Q i.e., A i n  Aj  =  0 
whenever i =  j ,  and y ieN A i =  Q. We allow, however, th a t A i =  0 for some agents i.
•  Each agent i G N  has a preference relation < i on the set of commodity bundles 
(B ,x )  w ith 0 Ç B  Ç Q and x G 1R+. We assume th a t < i can be represented by a 
u tility  function Ui of the form
Ui (B,x) : =  Vi (B)  +  x (i G N, 0 Ç B  Ç Q , x  G 1R+ ), (separability  for money) 
Vi (B) <  Vi (C)  whenever B  Ç C  and i G N , (monotononicity)
Vi(0) =  O.
C o m m e n t:  Separability  for m oney is the  m ost restrictive condition. In fact, it 
consists of four properties, nam ely
-  the  separability per se saying th a t Ui (B ,x )  =  Vi (B)  +  Wi (x) for some function Wj,, 
defined on 1R+,
-  the  strict monotonicity in money  saying th a t Wi is s tric tly  monotonic,
-  the  possibility of interpersonal comparison of utility expressed by Wi =  W j , and 
finally
-  the property  th a t m oney can be used as a physical m eans to  transfer utility because 
the m arginal u tility  for m oney is constant.
By trad ing  a coalition T  Ç N  can realize any red istribu tion  of the goods in | J j eT Aj  
and any red istribu tion  of the m oney supply ^ j eT m j . We call such a twofold redis-
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tribu tion  { C j , y j } j eT a T-reallocation. So, a T -reallocation { C j , y j } j eT m ust satisfy 
U jeT  Cj  =  U j eT  A j  and  j eT  yj  =  2 j eT  m j
As usual in general equilibrium  theory, we investigate, in this paper, the existence of 
core allocations and stable price equilibria and the relations between these concepts. 
This subject has been studied  by so m any au thors th a t one cannot even hope to  give 
a com plete overview. For th a t reason, we m ention only papers in the same spirit as 
the  present one. This means, papers in which conditions for existence or non-existence 
of core allocations or price equilibria are form ulated in term s of the prim itives of the 
model, initial endowments and u tility  functions (preferences).
M ost of the early  papers pu t severe restrictions on the u tility  functions and the initial 
money supply. The m ost common restrictions are the  following:
(a) There is a b ipartition  in the set of agents, sellers and buyers.
(b) The agents have initially a t m ost one good and have also need for a t m ost one 
good. We will call th is the one-one-condition
(c) Money supply is so abundant th a t every agent can buy w hatever he likes for his 
reservation value, the highest price he is ever willing to  pay i.e.,
Vi(Q) <  mi  (or mi  +  Vi(Ai)) (i G N ).
Shapley and Shubik (1972) study  the case satisfying bipartition , the  one-one condition 
and abundance. In fact, m oney is no t explicitly modeled bu t from the fact th a t an 
optim al assignm ent is never excluded because of lack of money, one m ay conclude 
th a t no agent has ever problem s to  ‘pay the b ill’.
In H enry (1970) all indivisible goods are substitu tes of each o ther (V (B ) =  f i (b) 
where b =  \B\) and f i is a concave function.
In Gale (1984) and Quinzii (1984) we find the existence of price equilibria in economies 
satisfying the  one-one-condition and abundance.
Wako (1986) proves the equivalence of strong core allocations and price equilibria in 
economies w ith the  one-one-condition. He allows for scarcity of money. In the last 
three papers the  u tility  functions are not necessarily quasi-linear (but continuously 
increasing in money).
The existence of price equilibria is also known in the case of additive reservation values 
i.e. when Vi (B ) =  ^ aeB V  (a ) and an abundance of money. In such an economy each 
indivisible good can be sold separately  by a second price auction.
Kelso and  Crawford (1982) designed a m echanism  th a t generates equilibrium  prices 
if the  reservation values {Vi ( C ) } c ç q  of each agent i satisfy the so called gross substi­
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tutability property . This means, loosely speaking, th a t a good a  in dem and by player i 
under price p  rem ains in dem and by player i, if the price p  is increased b u t p a rem ains 
the same.
In a recent m anuscript Beviá, Quinzii and Silva (1997) consider economies w ith an 
abundance of m oney (V (Q) <  Vi(Ai ) +  m i for every agent i) and reservation prices of 
the  form Vi (B)  =  ^ aeB V (a )  +  f i (b) where the  functions f i are concave functions of 
b =  \B\. They prove th a t every red istribu tion  { B i} ieN th a t maximizes social welfare 
is a price equilibrium  and th a t the set of equilibrium  prices form a com plete lattice. 
The economies they  consider satisfy the gross su b stitu tab ility  condition of Kelso and 
Crawford.
Kaneko (1982) considers an economy w ith b ipartition  and the one-one condition (and 
la ter on the many-one condition). His u tility  functions are more general th an  quasi­
linear. Furtherm ore, he requires th a t Ui (0 ,m i ) >  Ui (C, 0) for all C  =  0. His in­
terpretation of this requirem ent is different, more psychological: ‘agents do not like 
to  spend all their incom e’. B u t formally, it is the abundance condition. The au thor 
proves the equivalence of core allocations and price equilibria and the  existence of 
such allocations.
Finally, B ikhchandani and M am er (1997) investigate general economies w ith indi­
visible goods, m oney and  quasi-linear u tility  functions. They give a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the  existence of price equilibria under the  assum ption of abun­
dance. Their results cover m ost of the contents of our Theorem s 1 and 2. We will, 
however, assume a much weaker form of abundance.
From  th is overview one can learn th a t the existence of price equilibria requires two 
conditions:
(1) a condition on the reservation prices {Vi ( C ) } ieN,ccQ  and
(2) a condition on the money supply.
Because of the separability  of the u tility  functions for money, these conditions can be 
handled a good deal separately, as we shall see. The first condition will not depend on 
the initial endowm ents (we will call th is the  social wellfare condition or SW-condition) 
bu t the second condition (this will be called the abundance condition or AB-condition , 
for short) will do.
Before we can form ulate these conditions we need some terminology.
An N -redistribution  { B i} ie N maximizes social welfare or is efficient if ^2ieN Vi (Bi) 
is m axim al among all N -redistributions. The m axim al social welfare is denoted by
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SWmax(E ).
The next two concepts will be key concepts in our analysis.
A stochastic redistribution consists of a set of num bers yi¡C >  0, one for each agent i 
in N  and each subset C  of Q, w ith the property  th a t E CCq yi¡C =  1 for all i G N  and 
E C-ate  E . g n  y i,c =  1 for every com m odity a  G Q. So, a stochastic red istribu tion
Here e. and eC are the  characteristic vectors of {i} C N  and C  Ç Q and © denotes 
the direct sum: e. © eC G R N © R Q.
The num bers { y . ,C}Ccq  can be understood as a lo tte ry  for agent i. The num ber 
yi C is the  chance th a t agent i obtains bundle C . The second condition says th a t  the 
probability  th a t object a  is assigned to  one of the agents is also one. Note th a t  the 
integer-valued stochastic redistributions are exactly  the N -redistributions: each agent 
obtains w ith probability  1 a bundle C. and  { C i } ieN is a redistribution.
Expected social welfare realized by the stochastic redistribution { y . , c } c CQ,ieN is, by
definition^ i e N  E c cq  y . ,c  Vi (C ).
Now we can form ulate the S W -c o n d it io n :
An economy E satisfies the SW-condition if no stochastic red istribu tion  has a higher 
expected social welfare th an  S W max(E).
As m axim al expected social welfare is determ ined by the following linear program  
(LP):
m ax E ieN E CCq y i,C V.(C) under the  conditions 
y., c  >  0 for 0 Ç C  Ç Q and i G N ,
E CCQ y . ,c  =  1 for all i G N,
E c ..c k c H k n  y i,c =  1 for ^  a  G Q ,
the  SW -condition says th a t (LP) has an integer-valued optim al solution. Note th a t 
the SW -condition is not dependent on the initial endowments.
The A B -c o n d i t io n  is a weaker form of the  abundance condition we found in the 
literature.
An economy E satisfies the AB-condition if there is an N -red istribu tion  { B i} ieN 
th a t maximizes social welfare and satisfies the  inequalities V.(B.) <  Vi (Ai ) +  m.
The A B-condition depends on initial endowments. If e.g., the  initial d istribu tion  of 
the  indivisible goods { A i } ieN maximizes social welfare, it is even an em pty  condition.
is nonnegative solution of the  vector equation
(i G N ).
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The AB-condition stipulates th a t each agent has enough m oney to  sell Ai  for the 
price V.(A.) (the lowest price for which he is willing to  sell A .) and to  buy B.  for 
the price V.(B.)  (the highest price he is willing to  pay for B .). This makes clear th a t 
the A B-condition m ight be too restrictive. If the price for A.  is higher th an  Vi (Ai ) or 
the price of B.  is lower th a n  V.(B .), a smaller am ount of m oney is sufficient. We will 
frequently use the phrase ‘{ Bi } ie N  satisfies the  A B -condition’.
Note th a t the  A B-condition is much weaker th an  the usual abundance condition 
Vj(C) <  Vi (Ai ) +  m. (i G N , C  Ç Q)  (or even Vi (C) <  m.)  (see Bevia e t al (1997), 
B ikhchandani and M am er (1997)). These conditions are, in our opinion, unreasonably 
restrictive: every agent m ust be able to  buy all indivisible goods for the highest price 
he is willing to  pay.
The second key concept is th a t of a regular price vector.
A vector p G 1RQ is called a regular price vector if there is a vector q G 1RN such th a t 
(p, q) is an optim al solution of the  dual linear program  (LP)* th a t reads as:
m in p(Q ) +  q (N ) under the  conditions 
p (C ) +  qi >  Vi (C) for all i G N  and C  Ç Q.
The first result we will prove (Section 2) is th a t the A B-condition and the SW- 
condition are sufficient for the  existence of price equilibria. We can even make a more 
explicit statem ent: for any N -d istribu tion  { B i } ieN satisfying the A B-condition and 
for any regular price vector p  the  N -reallocation {B i , x i } ieN is a price equilibrium  
w ith equilibrium  price p  if x i : =  p ( A i ) +  m i — p ( B i ) (i G N ) (to satisfy the budget 
constrain t). If the intial m oney supply is increased (m i : =  m i +  A . w ith A . >  0 for 
every agent i G N ), the  A B-condition rem ains true  and {B i , x i =  xi +  A . } . ^  gives 
also an equilibrium. We call such an equilibria— stable under an increase of the initial 
m oney supply— a stable price equilibria.
The second result in Section 2 says th a t the  SW -condition is necessary for the  exis­
tence of stable price equilibria, th a t every stable price equilibrium  maximizes social 
welfare and equilibrium  prices are regular price vectors.
The rem aining p a rt of Section 2 investigates the  relation between core allocations of 
an economy E and the core elem ents of the TU-gam e associated w ith the economy E 
as well as the  question which core elem ents are associated w ith price equilibria.
The second p a rt of the  paper (Section 3 and 4) looks for m ethods to  find regular price 
vectors (potential equilibrium  prices) and to  check the SW -condition. In Section 3 
we use the  nucleolus concept from the theory  of TU-gam es to  com pute regular price
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vectors. We will connect the  problem  to  solve (LP)* w ith the com putation  of the 
nucleolus of the TU-gam e (N  U Q , W ) w ith player set N  U Q and coalition values
W  (T ): =  m ax ieTnN Vi (T n  Q) whenever T  n  N  =  0 and W ( T ) =  0 if T  n  N  =  0.
We will prove th a t, under very m ild conditions, a regular price vector can be found 
by two nucleolus calculations, one in (N  U Q, W ) and one in (N  U Q, W) ,  a TU-game 
th a t differs from the  first one in the value of the grand coalition only.
Because the nucleolus can only be calculated for m oderate values of \N\ +  \Q\ and 
this num ber tends to  be large, Section 4 investigates an alternative m ethod to  find a 
regular price vector. I t is inspired by the way Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) com pute 
the nucleolus of the  assignm ent game of Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Finally, if we have a regular price vector p  (or an optim al solution (p,q) of (LP)*), 
one can com pute the set B of pairs (i, C ) w ith p ( C ) +  q. =  Vi (C).  The SW -condition 
is satisfied if and only if th is collection B contains a N -redistribution.
1. B a s ic  d e f in it io n s  a n d  s ta t e m e n t  o f  t h e  th e o re m s .
Let us first repeat some definitions. Let (Bi , x i )ieN be an N -feasible reallocation.
A T -feasible reallocation { C j , y j } j eT is a weak improvement  (or strict improvement) 
upon (B . , x i )ieN if U j ( C j , y j ) >  U j ( B j , x j ) for all j  G T  and a t least one stric t 
inequality  (or Uj (Cj , y j  ) >  Uj (Bj , x j  ) for all j  G T  ).
As usual, we call an N -reallocation (Bi , x i )ieN Pareto-optimal  (or weakly Pareto-  
optimal ), if coalition N  does not have a weak im provem ent (or s tric t im provem ent). 
It is called a strong core allocation (or core allocation) if no coalition T  has a weak 
im provem ent (or a stric t im provem ent). A weak im provem ent { C j , y j } j eT can be 
transform ed into a stric t im provem ent, if there is an agent i* w ith  V.i* (C.* ) +  y.* >  
V.* (B .* ) +  x.* a n d  y.* >  0. This is always the case if the abundance condition 
Vi (Q) <  Vi (Ai ) +  m. (i G N ) holds. In th is case the  difference between weak Pare to  
o p tim a lity /P a re to  optim ality  and between co re /strong  core disappears.
An N -feasible reallocation (Bi , x i )ieN is a price equilibrium, if there exists a price 
vector p  G 1RQ w ith  the following properties:
p ( B i ) +  x. <  p ( A i ) +  m ., (i G N ) (budget constraints)
if Ui (C, y) >  Ui (Bi , x . ) for some C  C Q and i G N , then  p ( C ) +  y >  p ( A i ) +  m..
(m axim ality conditions)
By the stric t m onotonicity of the u tility  functions Ui , the  m axim ality conditions imply
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th a t the budget constrain ts are, in fact, equalities. Furtherm ore, by the m onotonicity 
of the reservation prices, an equilibrium  price is nonnegative.
D e f in it io n : A N -reallocation { B . , x i } ieN is a stable price equilibrium if there is a 
price vector p G 1RQ such th a t  the reallocation ({B ., x. +  A i }ieN is a price equilibrium  
for equilibrium  price p, if the initial m oney supply becomes m  +  A  and A  G R N .
For an economy E we define a TU-gam e (N, vg ) w ith coalition values
v g (S): =  S W max(E,S)  =  m ax { E j e s  V j(Cj ) : { C j } jes  is an S -red istribu tion  }.
So, vg (S ) is the  m axim al social welfare th a t can be realized in the sub-economy in 
which only the actions of agents in S  are considered.
Before we form ulate the first two theorem s of this section we give two examples. 
E x a m p le  1. Let N  =  {1, 2} and Q =  {a ,  ß} .  Let A i =  {a} and A 2 =  { ß }. The 
reservation values are additive
a ß
1 10 70
2 20 50
It is easy to  see th a t social welfare is optim ized if the agents sw itch their endowments. 
The set of regular price vectors is 10 <  p a <  20 and 50 <  pß <  70.
To support the  red istribu tion  ß  ^  1 and a  ^  2 by a regular price vector, player 1 
has, after paym ent, m 1 +  p a — pß G m 1 +  [—60, —30] and we see th a t lack of money 
m ay block the existence of regular equilibrium  prices (if m 1 <  30) or m ay block some 
regular equilibrium  prices (if 30 <  m 1 <  60).
Let us consider the case th a t  m  =  (10, 20) and the price vector is p  =  (15, 40). 
T hen the reallocation (0, 25) ^  1 and ({a, ß} ,  5) ^  2 is a price equilibrium  th a t 
does not maximize social welfare and the equilibrium  price is not regular. The b e tte r 
assignm ent ß  ^  1 and a  ^  2 cannot be realized because agent 1 does not have 
enough m oney to  buy ß .
E x a m p le  2. In the  second exam ple the reservation values {Vi ( B ) } ieN,Bcq  ex­
clude the existence of equilibrium  prices. The example comes from Bevia et al. (1997). 
N  =  {1, 2, 3} and Q =  {a, ß , 7 }. The reservation values are given in the tab le  and 
A 1 =  {a}, A2 =  { ß }  and A3 =  {7 }.:
7
a ß 7 a ß a j ß l aß^f
1 10 8 2 13 11 9 13
2 8 5 10 13 14 13 15
3 1 1 8 2 9 9 10
The au thors show th a t  the unique social optim um  [ a  ^  2, ß  ^  1 and 7 ^  3] is not 
supported  by regular equilibrium  prices. The reason is th a t  a stochastic redistribution 
has a higher value. If agent 1 obtains a  and ß  each w ith chance agent 2 obtains 7 or 
a ß  w ith equal chances and agent 3 obtains 7 or 0 each w ith chance the to ta l expected 
u tility  is 24.5, higher th an  the social optim um  24. And indeed if we increase e.g. V2(a) 
to  8.5, the  price vector p  =  (6.5, 4.5, 8) supports the  socially optim al redistribution, 
if there is enough m oney (m2 >  2 is sufficient). Note th a t, in the  original economy 
(with V2(a) =  8) the  social optim al red istribu tion  ß  ^  1, a  ^  2 and 7 ^  3 is a price 
equilibrium , if the prices are (8, 6, 8) (not regular) and m 2 =  2 (not abundant).
Let us form ulate the  first two theorem s of this section. In the next section we will 
give all the  proofs.
T h e o re m  1. [cf. B ikhchandani and M am er (1997)] An exchange economy E with 
quasi-linear utility functions, indivisible goods and money has a price equilibrium if 
the SW-condition and the AB-condition are satisfied.
In fact, we shall see th a t every redistribution  { B i} ieN for which the AB-condition 
holds can be extended to  a price equilibrium  {B ., x i } ieN and th a t the  set of equilib­
rium  prices consists of all regular price vectors.
In exam ple 1 we have seen th a t an economy m ay have equilibria th a t do not maximize 
social welfare and th a t equilibrium  prices need not be regular. These equilibria arise 
from a lack of money . They are unstable in the  sense th a t a (sufficiently high) increase 
of the initial m oney supply upsets the equilibrium  character of the  reallocation.
In the following theorem  we prove th a t the  SW -condition is a necessary condition for 
the existence of stable price equilibria.
T h e o re m  2. [cf. B ikhchandani and M am er (1997)] If an economy E with quasi­
linear utility functions, indivisible goods and money has a stable price equilibrium, 
then the SW-condition holds, every stable equilibrium allocation maximizes social wel­
fare and every equilibrium price is regular.
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The th ird  theorem  of th is section describes a relation between core allocations of E 
and the  core elem ents of the  TU-gam e (N, vg ). In th is theorem  a stronger A bundance 
condition occurs, namely:
An economy E satisfies the  Total A bundance condition if every coalition S  has an 
red istribu tion  { C j } jeS such th a t
E j e s  V j(Cj ) =  S W max(E, S)  and Vj(Cj ) <  V j( A j ) +  m j (j G S).
We say th a t a core elem ent of ( N , v g ) is realized by a core allocation { B i , x i } ieN if 
z. +  m.  =  V.(B .) +  x..  The core allocation {B ., x . } ieN gives the  u tility  level z +  m, 
the same as the  core allocation.
T h e o re m  3. If the AB-condition holds, then every core allocation z G Core ( N , v g )) 
can be realized by a core reallocation { B i , x i } ie N G Core (E). If the Total Abundance 
condition holds, then every core reallocation of E defines a core element of the TU­
game ( N, vg ).
In the last theorem  of this series we give a necessary and sufficient condition th a t a 
core elem ent of (N, vg ) can be realized by a stable price equilibrium.
T h e o re m  4. In an exchange economy E satisfying the AB-condition a core allo­
cation z G Core (N,vg  )) can be realized by a stable price equilibrium if  and only if for 
every stochastic redistribution { y . ,c } ie N,c c q  the following inequality holds:
^  yi , c  Vi(C) +  ^  yi ,a  (z. — V.(A .)) <  SWmax(E). (1)
i c  ieN
If we com pare inequality  (1) w ith the inequality in the  SW -condition, the  sim ularity 
is striking. Only the num bers V. (A . ) (i G N ) are replaced by the larger num bers z. 
for i G N .
2. T h e  e x is te n c e  o f  p r ic e  e q u il ib r ia :  n e c e s s a ry  a n d  su ff ic ie n t c o n d it io n s
We s ta r t by giving a proof of the fact th a t the SW -condition and the AB-condition 
guarantee the existence of price equilibria (Theorem  1).
P r o o f  o f  T h e o re m  1: Let { B i } ieN be any red istribu tion  of the  indivisible goods 
th a t maximizes social welfare and w ith the property  V.(B .) <  Vi(Ai ) +  m. (i G N ). 
Let (p, q) be any optim al solution of the  linear program  (LP)*: 
m in p(Q ) +  q (N ) under the  conditions 
p G 1RQ, q G 1RN ,
p(B ) +  q. >  Vi (B)  for B  Ç Q and i G N .
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Define x.: =  p ( A i ) +  m. — p ( B i ) for every agent i G N .
By the  SW -condition the integer-valued stochastic reallocation yi¡c =  1 if and only 
if C  =  B.  and  y ., c  =  0 if C  =  B., is an optim al solution of (LP). By com plem entary 
slackness, we find p( B .) +  q. =  Vi (Bi ) (i G N ).
S incep(A i) >  V.(Ai) — q. =  V i(A .)+ p (B i) — V.(B.), we find x . : =  p(A. )  +  m.  — p(B. )  >  
Vi(Ai ) +  m. — Vi (Bi ) >  0 by the AB-condition. So, x >  0.
If Vi (C)  +  y >  Vi (Bi ) + x i for some com m odity bundle C  Ç Q, y >  0 and i G N , then 
p ( C ) + y  >  Vi(C) — q. +  y >  Vi(Bi)  +  x. — q. =  p(B. )  +  x.  =  p(A .) +  m..
The first inequality follows from the feasibility condition p ( C ) +  q. >  V. ( C ). As this 
inequality  is an equality for C  =  B i , we find the th ird  relation. The last equality  follows 
from the  definition of x.. The N -reallocation { B i , x i } ieN is a price equilibrium  w ith 
equilibrium  price p. <
C o m m e n ts :  If we reconsider the  proof of Theorem  1, we see th a t every N - 
reallocation { B i} ieN satisfying the A B-condition and every regular price vector can 
be m atched to  a price equilibrium.
The SW -condition is also necessary for the existence of stable price equilibria (Theo­
rem  2).
P r o o f  o f  T h e o re m  2: Let { B i , x i } ieN be a stable price equilibrium  w ith equi­
librium  price p. Define q.: =  m axc cq  [V.(C) — p(C)] for each agent i G N . The pair 
(p, q) is a feasible point of (LP)*.
We prove th a t p ( B .) +  q. =  Vi (Bi ) for each agent i G N .
Let C  Ç Q be any com m odity bundle and let i G N  be any agent. Let y  be the 
real num ber y :=  Vi (Bi ) +  x. — Vi (C)  and let 5 be any positive num ber. Then 
Vi(C ) +  y  +  5 > V i ( B i  ) + x i .
I f  y >  0 , the m axim ality condition and the budget constrain t generate the inequality 
p ( C ) + y + 5  >  p(A i )+ m i =  p (B i ) + x i . So, p ( C )+ y  >  p ( B . ) + x i . Substitu tion  of y  gives 
p ( C ) +  V. ( B i) + x .  — Vi(C) >  p ( B i ) + x .  and therefore, V .(C) — p ( C ) <  V.(B.) — p (B .). 
I f  y  h a p p e n s  to  b e  n e g a tiv e , we use the fact th a t  {B ., x . + A .}  is also an equilibrium  
if the  initial am ount of money is m  +  A. Then we define y: =  Vi (Bi ) + x .  +  A . — Vi (C) 
and now y >  0 if A . is large enough. We can proceed as before and find again 
V i(C) — p ( C ) <  Vi(Bi) — p(Bi) .  So, p ( B i ) + q .  =  Vi(Bi) for all i G N .
Then we have a feasible point (p, q) of (LP)* and  the integer-valued stochastic re­
d istribu tion  yi¡c =  1 if and only if C  =  B. (i G N ) and if yi¡c >  0 we have an 
equality in the  dual program . From  com plem entary slackness follows th a t (p, q) is
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optim al in (LP)* (a regular price vector) and the integer-valued redistribution { y . , c } 
maximizes the linear program  (LP) (the SW -condition). F inally  the redistribution  
{ B i }  ieN maximizes social welfare. <
Sum m arizing the results of Theorem  1 and 2 we find th a t the  SW -condition is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of stable price equilibria, as soon 
as the m oney supply satisfies the AB-condition, a stable price equilibrium  maximizes 
social welfare and equilibrium  prices are regular price vectors. For unstable price 
equilibria the last two sta tem ents need not be true. In example 1 the  equilibrium  
price p  =  (15, 40) is not regular and the reallocation % ^  1 and { a ß }  ^  2 does 
not maximize social welfare. Com paring th is result w ith the  results of B ikhchandani 
and M am er (1997) we find the following difference. B & M assume the stronger AB- 
condition by which every efficient d istribu tion  satisfies our AB-condition. Under this 
assum ption they  prove the equivalence of the SW -condition and the existence of price 
equilibria.
P r o o f  o f  T h e o re m  3: Let z be a core allocation of the  TU-gam e ( N , v g ). Let 
{ B i } ieN be an N -red istribu tion  satisfying the AB-condition. We define xi : =  z. +  m. — 
Vi (Bi ) for each agent i G N . Since z is a core element, we have z. >  v g (i) =  Vi (Ai ) 
and x. >  Vi (Ai ) +  m. — Vi (Bi ) >  0 by the AB-condition. T hen { B i , x i } ieN is an 
N -reallocation because of z ( N ) =  v g ( N ) =  S W max(E) =  E ieN V.(B .).
Suppose T  is a coalition and { C j , y j } j eT is a T -reallocation and Vj (Cj ) + y j  >  Vj (Bj  ) +  
xj  for all agents j  G T  and there is a t least one stric t inequality. Then
D v  c  > + »  ] > £  V  b  >+*» ] =  E  [zj +  mj  ] by the definition of x j . Then
j eT  jeT jeT
vg ( T ) >  £  V  c  ) > Y , z ,  =  z ( T ) in contradiction w ith z G C o re ( N , v g ). 
j eT  jeT
Conversely, let { B i , x i } ieN be a core reallocation of E and define z. by the equality 
zi +  m i =  Vi(Bi) +  x..  Then z (N  ) =  E ieN Vi (B .). Suppose th a t z ( T  ) <  vg (T  ) for 
some coalition T . Note th a t also T  =  N  is one of the possibilities. Because of the 
Total AB-condition there is a T -reallocation {Cj  } j eT w ith E j eT Vj (Cj  ) =  vg ( T ) 
and Vj (Cj ) <  Vj (Aj ) +  m j .
From  the definition of zj  and z ( T ) < E j eT Vj (Cj  ) we infer
^  [Vj (Bj ) +  xj ] =  ^  [zj  +  m j ] <  ^  [Vj (Cj ) +  mj ].
j eT  jeT jeT
For every agent j  G T  there is a num ber yj  such th a t Vj (Cj  ) +  yj  =  Vj (Bj  ) +  xj  and
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by the core-relations for coalition { j }, we have
yj  =  [Vj (Bj  ) +  x j ] — Vj (Cj  ) =  (zj +  mj  ) — Vj (Cj  ) >  [Vj (Aj ) +  m j ] — Vj (Cj  ) >  0.
Furtherm ore, E j eT yj <  m ( T ). So, there is a num ber 5 >  0 such th a t { C j , yj  +  5 } j eT 
is a T -reallocation and an im provem ent upon { B i , x i } ie N . This is not possible and 
therefore, z G Core (N,vg  ). <
P r o o f  o f  T h e o re m  4: Let z be a core element of ( N , v g ) and { B i} ieN an N - 
reallocation satisfying the AB-condition.
We prove th a t the core element z  can be realized by a stable price equilibrium  if and 
only if the following linear program  has m inim um  value 0 .
min p(Q ) — r ( N ) under the  conditions 
p G 1RQ and r G 1RN ,
p ( C ) — r. >  Vi (C) — V .(B.) for i G N  and  C  =  A., 
p (A i) — ri >  zi — Vi(Bi) for i G N .
If  the linear program has minimum value 0 , we have, for the case C  =  B ., p ( B i ) — r. =
0 i.e., r. =  p ( B i ). So, we find V.(B .) — p ( B .) >  V. (C ) — p ( C ) for every agent i G N  and 
every bundle C  =  A . . For A.  we find Vi (Bi ) — p ( B . ) >  z. — p ( A i ) >  Vi(Ai ) — p ( A i ). 
Then (p,q) w ith  q. =  Vi (Bi ) — p ( B .) is an optim al point of (LP)*. If we take xi : =  
z. +  mi — V.(B.)  we get p(B. )  +  x.  =  z. +  m. — V.(B.) + p ( B . )  <  p(A. )  +  m..
In fact the last inequality is an equality because of
p ( A i ) — r i >  zi — Vi(Bi), z (N ) =  E ieN V. (B. ) and p(Q ) — r ( N ) =  0.
The proof of the  m axim ality  condition is the same as in the  proof of Theorem  1. So 
we find a price equilibrium  { B . , x i } ieN and in fact a stable price equilibrium.
Conversely, if z  is realized by a stable price equilibrium {B ., x i } ieN a n d p  is a (regular) 
equilibrium  price, then  z.  +  m.  =  Vi (Bi ) +  x. (z is realized by { B i , x i } i eN ) and 
p(B. )  +  x.  =  p( A i ) +  m.  (the budget constrain t) gives p(A i ) — p ( B .) =  z. — Vi (Bi ). 
Furtherm ore, p  is a regular price vector and therefore, there exists a vector q G 
1R n  such th a t p (C ) +  q. >  V.( C ) (i G N , C  Ç Q) and p ( B i ) +  q. =  V.(B .). Then, 
p ( C ) — p ( B i ) >  Vi ( C ) — Vi (Bi ) for i G N  and C  =  A.. If we define r . : =  p ( B i ) we have 
a feasible point of the linear program  w ith p(Q ) — r ( N ) =  0 .
The duality  theory  of linear program m ing gives th a t z  can be realized by a stable price 
equilibrium  if and only if the  dual program  has m axim al value 0. The dual program  
has the following form
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m ax E E Vi,c [Vi(C) — Vi(Bi)] +  ^  '  Vi,Ai [z. — V.(Bi)] under the conditions
ieN c=Ai ieN
yi,c >  0, (i e  N , C  Ç Q)E yi,c (ei © e c ) =  eN © eQ. 
i,c
The Theorem  follows from y i}c Vi (Bi ) =  Vi (Bi ) =  S W max (£). <
i,c ieN
E x a m p le  2 (continued): If we take in exam ple 2 the value of V2(a ) =  8.5 (instead 
of 8), we have two stochastic redistributions maxim izing social welfare, nam ely
yi,ß =  y 2 ,a =  y3,Y =  1 and all o ther y. ,c  =  0 and
y i, a =  y i ,ß =  y2, Y =  y2, aß =  y3,0 =  y3Y =  0.5 and all o ther yi , c  =  0.
An optim al solution of (LP)* m ust have equalities where yi¡c >  0 or yi¡c >  0. Then 
there is only one solution: (p; q) =  (6.5, 4.5, 8 ; 3.5, 2, 0).
The game ( N , v g ) has the values: 
v£ (1) =  10, v£ (2) =  5, v£ (3) =  8, 
v£ (12) =  16.5, v£ (13) =  18, v£ (23) =  13, 
v£ ( N  ) =  24.5.
The core consists of the segment between (11.5, 5, 8) and (10, 6.5, 8) and only the 
second point can be realized by a price equilibrium.
3. C o m p u ta t io n  o f  e q u i l ib r iu m  p r ic e  v e c to rs
This section and the subsequent section investigate the possibilities to  check the SW- 
condition and to  com pute stable price equilibria and the ir equilibrium  price vectors. 
In fact we s ta r t w ith the last problem , the com putation  of regular price vectors i.e., 
an optim al solution of (LP)*.
A reader, fam iliar w ith the theory  of TU-games, will read  the linear relations in (LP)
yi,c >  0 and ^  y .,c (e. © e c ) =  eN © eQ 
i,c
as a ‘balancedness re la tion ’ and the  relations in (LP)* 
p(C)  + q i >  Vi (C) for i e  N  and C  Ç Q 
as ‘core inequalities’ for coalitions {i}^J C  C N  U Q.
Therefore, it seems to  be interesting to  introduce a cooperative game w ith player set 
N  U Q and  coalition values
W (T ) :=  m ax V.(T n  Q) if T  n  N  =  0 and  W ( T ) =  0 if T  n  N  =  0.
ieT cn
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To solve (L P )* the com putation  of the  prenucleolus of the game ( N  U Q, W ) will be 
helpful.
For convenience of the reader we repeat the  definition. Let (N ,v )  be a TU-game. If 
x e  1RN w ith x ( N ) =  v ( N ) we call the  vector x  a pre-imputation . For a coalition S  Ç 
N  and  a pre-im putation  x  the  excess of S  is defined by exc (S ,x  | v): =  v ( S ) — x ( S ). 
Let Exc be the m ap th a t assigns to  a pre-im putation  x  the  vector
r)N
E x c (x ):=  {exc (S, x  | v )}Sc N e  IR2 .
The m ap 0: ]R?N ^  IR2  orders the coordinates of vectors in M 2N in weakly decreasing 
order. A pre-im putation  x  is a point in the  prenucleolus of the game (N, v) if 
0 o Exc (x) ^iex 0 o Exc (y) for all pre-im putations y 
where ^ lex is the  lexicographic ordering of ]R2 (Sobolev (1975)). If we restric t the 
candidates x  to  the  imputations i.e. pre-im putations also satisfying the inequalities 
x. >  v(i)  for all i e  N , we ob tain  the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)).
The following facts are known about the  (pre-)nucleolus:
(a) The nucleolus as well as the  prenucleolus consists of one point. We denote this 
point by n u (N , v) and  nu*(N, v), respectively (Schmeidler (1969)).
(b) If the game (N ,v )  is zero-monotonic i.e. v ( S ) + E ieT \ s  v(i) <  v ( T ) whenever 
S  C T , then  the nucleolus and  the prenucleolus are the same (Maschler, Peleg and 
Shapley (1979)).
(c) If x  is the prenucleolus of (N, v) and B is the  set of coalitions w ith m axim al 
excess (w .r.t. x), then  B is balanced. A collection of coalitions is called balanced if 
there  are positive num bers XT , one for each T  e  B, such th a t E teb  ^t  eT =  eN 
(Sobolev (1975), K ohlberg (1971)).
(d) There are several m ethods to  com pute the prenucleolus of a TU-gam e (see 
Kopelowitz (1967), D ragan (1974),Sankaran (1991), Solymosi (1993), P o tters  et al. 
(1996), Derks and K uipers (1996)), if the  num ber of players is not too  large, say 
IN I <  20.
A bout the present game ( N  U Q, W ) the  following observations can be made:
•  ( N  U Q , W ) is a zero-norm alized m onotonic game i.e., W (i) =  W (a ) =  0 for all
i e  N  and  a  e  Q and W  (T  U i) >  W  (T  ) if i e T , and W  (T  U a) >  W  (T  ) if a  e T .
•  The prenucleolus and the  nucleolus of (N  U Q , W  ) are the  same (point (b)). So, if 
(x, y) is the  prenucleolus of W , we have, in particu lar, x >  0 and y >  0 .
•  The m axim al excess E 1: =  m axT exc (T, ( x ,y ) \W  ) >  0, because W  ( N  U Q) =  
W  ({i*} U Q) for some agent i* e  N  and x ( N \ i * )  >  0. T hen {i*}U  Q has an ex-
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cess >  0 .
The first step in the procedure to find a regular price vector consists of the com putation  
of the  nucleolus of (N  U Q, W ): (x, y) e  R-N x R Q.
If the m axim al excess E 1 =  0, the pair p: =  y  and  q: =  x  is a feasible point of (LP)*. 
If W  ( N  U Q)  =  V.* (Q) =  W  (i* U Q), we have p(Q ) +  q* >  V.* (Q) =  W  ( N  U Q) =  
p(Q ) +  q ( N ). Hence, qj =  0 for j  =  i* and p(Q ) +  q.* =  V.i* (Q). For any other 
feasible point (p, q) of (LP)*, we also have qj >  Vj (0) =  0 and p(Q)  +  q.* >  V.i* (Q). 
Conclusion: (p, q) is an optim al point of (LP)* and  p :=  y  is a regular price vector, 
whenever E 1 = 0 .
If E 1 >  0, we increase, in the second step, the value of x.  ( x . :=  x.  +  S.) till all 
inequalities x . + y (C ) >  Vi (C) are satisfied. T hen x ( N )+ y (Q ) =  W ( N U Q ) + E ieN S.. 
The vector (x, y) is a core allocation in the TU-gam e (N  UQ,  W ) where W  (T  ) =  W  (T  ) 
if T  =  N  U Q and W  ( N  U Q) =  W  ( N  U Q ) +  Z ieN S..
The third step is the  com putation  of the  nucleolus of (N  U Q, W ): (u, z) e  R N  x R Q.
Let —E 2 be the m axim al excess of ( z,u)  in the  game (N  U Q , W ). Then E 2 >  0 
because (N  U Q, W ) has a core element, nam ely (x, y). In Theorem  5 we will prove 
th a t p :=  z is a regular price vector, if za >  E 2 for all com m odities a  e  Q.
T h e o re m  5. If the vector (u, z) is the (pre-)nucleolus of the game ( N UQ, W ) and 
no one-good-coalition {a} has maximal excess, then p  =  z is a regular price vector. 
P ro o f :  Let —E 2 be the  m axim al excess of the point (u, z)  in the game (N U  Q, W ) 
(for coalitions T  =  0 , N  U Q). As the core of this game is nonem pty ( (x ,y)  is a core 
element), we have E 2 >  0. As u. >  W ({i} +  E 2 for all i e  N , we have ui : =  u. —E 2 >  0. 
As no one-good-coalition {a} has highest excess, we have za >  E 2 for all a  e  Q.
We prove th a t p : =  z and q: =  u is an optim al point of (LP)*.
Since u. +  z(C  ) >  W  ({i} U C  ) +  E 2 =  Vi( C ) +  E 2, the  point (z, u) is a feasible point of 
(LP)*. Let B be the  collection of coalitions T  w ith excess —E 2 w ith respect to  (u, z). 
Then, there is a balancedness relation YITeB ^t  eT =  eN © cq w ith  XT >  0 for all 
T  e B .
Case (i): E 2 >  0. In th is case T  n  N  consists of one agent for every coalition T  e B .  
By assum ption, T  n  N  cannot be empty. If T  n  N  contains more then  one agent, there 
is an agent i* e  T  n  N  such th a t W  (T ) =  W  ((T  n  Q) U {i*}). As uj >  E 2 >  0 for 
j  e  T  n  N  and j  =  i*, we get W  (T  ) — u(T  n  N  ) — z (T n  Q) <  —2 E 2.
So, every coalition T  e  B is of the form {i} U C  w ith i e  N  and C  Ç Q and the
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balancedness relation  is E { i}uc e B ^{i|u c  e. © ec  =  eN © cq . This defines a stochastic 
redistribution.
Taking the inner product w ith (u, z) gives
u (N ) +  z(Q ) =  J2{i}uceB  ^{ iju c  (ui +  z(C )) =  E {i}uceB  ^{ iju c  Vi (C ).
By the duality  theorem  (u, z) is an optim al point of (LP)* and z is a regular price 
vector.
Case (ii): E 2 =  0. In th is case u =  u. Suppose th a t (p, q) is an optim al point of (LP)* 
and  p(Q)  +  q (N ) <  u ( N ) +  z(Q ).
We prove first th a t p >  0. If some price p a <  0, we find for every agent i e  N  and 
every bundle C  C Q w ith a  e  C
p ( C ) +  q. >  p ( C  U {a}) +  q. >  V.(C U {a}) >  V.(C).
If r/: =  m inieN c  : a / c  [p(C ) + q. — Vi ( C )] >  0, we can replace p a by p a +  n and all q. by 
q. — n. We keep a feasible point of (LP)* w ith a lower value for the objective function.
Then the point (p, q) satisfies the inequalities p(T  n  Q) +  q(T n  N ) >  W ( T ) for all 
coalitions T  C N  U Q. If we divide the difference between u ( N  ) +  z(Q ) =  W  ( N  U Q) 
and  p(Q)  +  q (N ) equally among the players in N  U Q, we get an im putation  w ith all 
excesses <  0. Then (u, z) is not the nucleolus. <
R e m a rk :  In  the second case E 2 =  0 we did not use the inequality za >  E 2 =  0. 
Therefore, we can replace the condition in Theorem  5 by the weaker condition ‘za > 
E 2 if E 2 >  0 ’. So, if Theorem  5 applies i.e., if E 2 = 0  or za >  E 2 >  0, we find a 
regular price vector by com puting two nucleoli in TU-gam es w ith n  +  q players.
If (u, z ) is an optim al solution of (LP)*, every stochastic reallocation w ith m axim al 
expected social welfare {y i¡c} c eN,c'CQ has yi¡c =  0 if u. +  z (C ) >  Vi(C) (comple­
m entary  slackness). To find an equilibrium  allocation one has to  com pute all pairs 
( i , C ) w ith u. +  z (C ) =  V (C ) and look for a subset { ( i , C i ) } ieN where { C i } ie is a 
red istribu tion  of Q . Is th is possible then  the SW -condition is satisfied and we have a 
price equilibrium . If such a red istribu tion  does not exist, then  the SW -condition does 
not hold and there is no stable price equilibrium . The reader should not underestim ate 
the difficulty of the last problem. In general it is an N P -h a rd  problem . If the num ber 
of pairs (i, C ) w ith u. +  z(C ) =  Vi (C ) is not too  large, it can be done by considering 
all possible com binations or by any other ad-hoc m ethod.
E x a m p le  2 (continued) In example 2 we find for the nucleolus of (N  U Q, W ):
x  =  (1.33, 1.67, 0) and  y  =  (4.67, 3, 4.33) and W  ( N  U Q) =  15. We used an
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algorithm  based on P o tters  et al. (1996) to  com pute the nucleolus.
The coalitions (1 ,a ) , (2, 7 ), ( 2 , ß j )  have highest excess E 1 =  S1 =  S2 = 4  and (3 ,y) 
has excess S3 =  3.67. Therefore, W  ( N  U Q) +  15 +  4 +  4 +  3.67 =  26.67.
The nucleolus of (N  U Q , W ) is u =  (4.22, 2.72, 0.72) and z =  (6.5, 4.5, 8). The 
following coalitions have the  highest excess E 2 =  —0.72: (1, a ), (1, ß), (2, 7 ), (2, aß)  
(3, 0) and (3 ,7 ). All z-coordinates are larger th an  0.72. From  Proposition  5 follows th a t 
z =  (6.5, 4.5, 8) is a regular price vector. Furtherm ore, B does not contain a partition  
and the regular equilibrium  price (6.5, 4.5, 8) does not allow a price equilibrium. 
There is no stable price equilibrium.
4. T h e  c o m p u ta t io n  o f  e q u i l ib r iu m  p r ic e s : a n  a l te r n a t iv e  a p p ro a c h
In th is section we give an alternative m ethod to  com pute a solution of the  linear 
program  (LP)* and a regular price vector. We found our inspiration in the m ethod 
used by Solymosi and R aghavan (1994) to  com pute the nucleolus of assignm ent games.
(LP)* m in p(Q ) +  q ( N ) under the conditions
p e  ]R Q , q e  ]R N ,
p (B ) +  q. >  Vi (B) for B  Ç Q and i e  N .
We describe an iterative process th a t leads to  a solution in finitely m any iterations. 
The idea is the following.
We s ta r t w ith a feasible point (p, q) of (LP)* such th a t every agent i has a bundle 
C  w ith p ( C ) +  q. =  Vi (C).  Let T  =  T(p,  q) be the  set of pairs (i, C ) satisfying the 
equality p ( C ) +  q. =  Vi (C).  Then we look for a vector (u, v) e  ]RQ x ]RN satisfying the 
inequalities v. +  u ( C ) >  0 for (i, C) e  T(p,  q) and v ( N ) +  u(Q ) <  0. If such a vector 
exists, (p +  t u , q  +  t v )  is a feasible point of (LP)* for small positive values of t. If t 0 is 
the largest value of t  for which (p +  t u , q  +  t v )  is a feasible point of (LP)*, we have a 
new feasible point of (LP)* (p ,q ) :=  ( p + t0 u , q + t 0 v) w ith p(Q) +  q(N)  <  p(Q ) +  q(N ). 
We repeat the procedure w ith (p, q) instead of (p, q). If such a vector (u,v)  does not 
exist, then  (p, q) is an optim al solution of (L P)*.
Let us describe the procedure in more detail.
Initialization: To s ta r t w ith we give p a the second highest value among the num ­
bers {Vi (a ) } ieN (at least two agents are interested in {a}, can make a nonnegative 
profit by buying a )  and q. : =  m axc cQ [V (C ) —p ( C )]. T h e n p a >  0 and  q. >  Vi (0) =  0. 
(p, q) is a feasible point of (L P)*. Each agent i has a com m odity bundle C  Ç Q w ith 
p (C ) +  q. =  V. ( C ). If the reservation values are additive, the initial price vector is
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already a regular price vector.
Iterations: In each itera tion  we look for a direction (u, v) G 1RQ x 1RN th a t  satisfies 
the inequalities
Vi +  u ( C ) >  0 for (i, C ) g T  and 
v ( N ) +  u(Q) <  0
To find a direction (u, v) we introduce ‘slack’ variables zi¡c  >  0 and w rite the relations 
of (LP)* as vi +  u(C ) — z ic  =  0, zijC >  0 for (i, C ) G T.
From  these linear equations we elim inate the  variables vi and as m any variables ua 
as possible. Let Q i be the set of a ’s th a t are elim inated and Q 2: =  Q \Q i.
Then we have linear equalities of the  form
vi +  Fi(uß, Zi,c ) =  0 for i G N  
ua +  G a (u,ß, zi ,c ) =  0 for a  G Qi
some linear equations of the form Hp(zi,c ) =  0 ( in the slack variables only). 
The functions Fi , G a and  H p are linear functions of uß (ß G Q 2) and Zi C ((i, C ) g T ) .  
Finally, we can elim inate from the equations Hp =  0 some slack variables Zi C as 
functions of the rem aining slack variables. Let T1 be the  set of slack variables th a t 
are elim inated and T2: =  T \ T 1. The variables Zi C w ith (i, C ) g T1 are also elim inated 
from the Fi- and  G a-equations.
Substitu ting  the Fi- and  G a -equations in the objective function v ( N ) +  u(Q ) gives 
the  equation v ( N ) +  u(Q ) =  — E Fi(uß,Zi ,c ) —^ 2 G a (uß,Zi ,c ) +  E u ß .
i^N aGQi ß^Q2
This is a linear expression in the  variables uß (ß G Q 2) and the variables Zi c  w ith 
(i, C ) g T2. After these elim inations we have linear equalitions of the following form:
1N
0N
1Qi
0Qi
1Ti
°Ti
^ Q 2
B Q2
dQ2
A t2
B T2
CQ2 ( =  0) CT2
dT2 -
vN
0
uQi
ZTi =
0
uQ2
-  ZT2 -
As usual, 1X is the  identity  m atrix  of size X  and 0X is the zero vector of size X . 
The m atrices A x  , B X and CX are m atrices w ith columns indexed by X  and dX is 
an X -vector.
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C a se  (0): If all coefficients of the  uß-variables vanish (dQ2 =  0) and the coefficients 
of the Zi c -variables are nonnegative (d-r2 >  0), there is no direction (u,v)  in which 
p(Q)  +  q ( N ) decreases. T hen (p, q) is optim al in (LP)*.
C a se  (1): If dQ2 =  0, we take one good ß  w ith \dß \ is m axim al. We define uß : =  +1, 
if dß <  0 is negative and uß : =  —1, if dß >  0. We take all o ther variables uß/ : =  0 if 
ß' G Q 2\{ ß }  as well as the slack variables Zi¡c =  0. The values for vi (i G N ) and 
ua (a G Q 1) are com puted from the F,-equation  and the G a -equation respectively. 
T hen we have a direction (u, v) in which p(Q ) +  q ( N ) decreases and all equalities 
p (C ) +  qi =  Vi (C) are kept. The new pair (p, Z) will be p  =  p  +  t 0 u and Z =  q +  t 0 v 
where
t 0: =  m in {(Vk(D) — p(D)  — qk) / ( v k +  u(D))  for the  pairs (k, D)  w ith  v k +  u(D)  <  0}.
The pairs (k, D)  for which the m inim um  is obtained, enter the  collection T . We add 
the corresponding equations p(D ) +  qk — Zk,D =  0 and elim inate the variables qi 
(i G N ), p a (a G Q)  and Zi¡c w ith (i, C ) g T1 i.e., we restore the basis we had  before. 
As no new vectors ek ® eD is linear dependent on { c, ® ec  : (i, C ) G T }, the rank of 
these vectors increases. So, a t least one new pß variable can be elim inated and after 
a t m ost \Q2 \ iterations of this kind, we have dQ =  0.
C a se  (1 ’): In exceptional cases we find dQ =  0 and Q 1 =  Q. In th is case we perform  
the same itera tion  as in case (1) a t any place ß  G Q 2. In this case we increase the 
price of p ß , keep the  o ther prices in Q 2 constant and the slack variables zero. The 
value of q, (i G N ) and the prices p a (a G Q 1) are adapted . Also in th is case the rank 
of T  increases.
After a t m ost q iterations the collection of vectors {e,  ® ec  : (i, C) G T }  has rank 
n  +  q and Q 1 =  Q. n  =  \N\ and q =  \Q\. The equations have the form:
1N A t2 1 f vn 0
1Q B T2 uQ
1Ti CT2 zTi 0
-0n  0q 0t i  dT2 J L zt2
L e m m a  6 . If no iterations of type (1) are possible anymore, then
(i,c)eT2
19
P ro o f :  In all in tial equations p ( C ) +  q, — Zi c  =  0 we have the following identity
^ 2  [coefficient of p a] (0 0  ea ) +  E [coefficient of q,] (ei 0  0)
aeQ ieN
+  [coefficient of Zi¡c ] (e, 0  ec ) =  0
(i,c )eT
This does not change under elim ination of variables and in the goal function we s ta rt 
w ith (and keep) the equality:
^ 2  [coefficient of pa] (0 0  ea ) +  E [coefficient of q,] (ei 0  0)
aeQ ieN
+  E  [coefficient of z , , c ](e , 0  e c ) =  (eN 0  cq).
(i,c)eT
If dQ =  0, we have [coefficient of Zijc ] (e, 0  ec ) =  (eN 0  cq ). <
(i,c )eT
Note th a t Lem m a 6 gives a stochastic red istribu tion  if dT2 >  0. This will be the  case 
in m any situations and we are done. If not, we have to  proceed w ith case (2).
C a se  (2): If Q 1 =  Q bu t some of the Zi c -variables still have a negative coefficient, 
we have to  proceed more carefully.
The idea is to  give a variable Zi c  occurring in the objective function w ith a negative 
coefficient the  value +1. B ut, if we do so and com pute the values of Zi c  ((i, C ) g T ) ,  
we m ay find negative values for some of the  variables in T1 and th is is not allowed 
(in the direction (u,v)  we would leave the set of feasible points of (LP)* im m ediately 
i.e., for all t  >  0). Therefore, before we choose the direction we have to  take care 
th a t  a Zi c -variable occurring in the  objective function w ith a negative coefficient has 
only nonpositive coefficients in its column in Ct2 . Here we make the transition  from 
simple linear algebra to  simplex m ethod techniques bu t only in the  subm atrix
¡Ti CT2
0Ti dT2
We s ta r t w ith an a ttem p t to  make dT2 >  0.
ca se  (2 ’): As long as there is a negative coefficient in dT2, say at place ( i , C ) and 
in the  Zi c -colum n of Ct2 there is a positive en try  we stay  in case (2’). Notice th a t 
the rows of the m atrix  [Iti , Ct2 ] are lexicographically larger th an  the 0-vector. In the 
zZi , c -colum n we perform  a pivot operation  such th a t all rows in the  m atrix  rem ain 
lexicographically larger th an  the 0-vector. Then the objective function becomes lex­
icographically larger and we cannot come in an infinite loop. So, after finitly m any
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steps the objective function has only nonnegative coefficients or the entries in the CT2 - 
m atrix  above the places (i, C ) where dT2 is negative are all <  0. If the  last s ta tem ent 
is tru e  we go to  case (2” ).
ca se  (2 ” ): Let (i, C ) be a position in the objective function w ith a negative coeffi­
cient. As the variable Zi c  is not in the  present basis, we can find a vector (v, u, Z) th a t 
solves the system  of linear equations and gives Zi c  =  +1. Zk,D gets only a positive 
value if Zk, D is in the  basis and the unique equation containing Zk , D has a negative 
coefficient a t place ( i , C ). By going in the direction (u,v)  these pairs (k ,D)  (and 
the pair (i, C )) leave the set T . Furtherm ore, the objective function decreases in the  
direction (u, v ). Therefore, there  is a t least one position in the  (to tal) zZi , c -column 
th a t is positive. We perform  a pivot operation  a t such a position and take the precau­
tion th a t all rows rem ain lexicographically larger th an  the 0-vector (i.e. we choose the 
equation w ith the highest index). So, exactly one v,- or u a -variable leaves the basis 
and the objective function gets a positive coefficient for this variable. We delete this 
equation, the equations containing the variables Zk,D >  0 and also the colum n Zi c . 
So, we lose one equation in the v , -  or u a -p a r t  (the upper p a rt of the  m atrix) and 
some equations of the  zZ-part (the lower p a rt of the  m atrix). The rank of the upper 
p a rt is n  +  q — 1 after deletion. Along the half-line (p, q ) + t ( u , v ) ,  t  >  0 and Z =  0 the 
rem aining equations are satisfied and the objective function decreases. A fter a while 
one (or more th an  one) new pair (l, E)  becomes tigh t and by adding the equations 
p (E ) +  qi — Zi,E =  0 the rank  of the  u- and v-part of the m atrix  is n  +  q again, as 
ei 0  eE is linearly independent from the vectors e, 0  ec  th a t rem ained. We restore 
the  basis and re tu rn  to  case (2).
A bout the  perform ance of the  algorithm  the following rem arks can be made:
(i) Case (1) requires a t m ost q pivot operations.
(ii) Every tim e we enter case (2) we have a collection T  (p, q) =  T  of tigh t pairs (i, C  ) 
of rank n  +  q and never the same one as before, as p ( C ) +  q, =  V (C ) for (i, C ) g T  
has a unique solution and the value of the objective function increases every time. 
This m eans th a t the  algorithm  is finite and the num ber of possible T ’s gives a (very 
coarse) bound for the num ber of iterations in case (2).
(iii) Case (2’) requires only finitely m any pivot operations, since the objective function 
is increasing lexicographically.
Let us show the algorithm  in an example.
E x a m p le  3. Let £  be an economy w ith four agents and four goods. The reser-
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vation values are given in the following table.
a ß 7 (5 a ß a j aS
1 4 6 4 7 11 6 7
2 5 5 6 9 12 10 11
3 2 4 3 5 7 6 9
4 7 10 7 9 10 10 10
ß l ßö ■jó a ß j aßö a j ö ß j ö N
1 13 14 10 13 16 14 16 18
2 10 14 12 16 15 14 18 19
3 10 12 8 11 13 10 12 17
4 13 12 14 17 16 16 18 19
Initialization: We s ta r t w ith p  =  (5, 6, 6, 9), the  second highest reservation prices. 
C om puting V  ( C ) — p ( C ) we get the following tab le  The asterisks * denote the places 
where V,(C) — p ( C ) is m axim al.
a ß 7 (5 a ß a j aS
1 -1 0 -2 -2 0 -5 - 7
2 0 -1 0 0 1* -1 -3
3 -3 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -5
4 2 4* 1 0 -1 -1 -4
ß l ßö ■jö aßY aßö a j ö ß j ö N
1 1* -1 -5 -4 -4 -6 -5 -8
2 -2 -1 -3 -1 -5 -6 -3 -7
3 -2 -3 -7 -6 -7 -10 -9 -9
4 1 -3 -1 0 -4 -4 -3 -7
We see th a t q =  (1, 1, 0, 4) and T  consists of the pairs: (1, ß j ) ,  (2, aß) ,  (3, 0), (4, ß). 
The value of the objective function is 32. The tab leau  for the  first itera tion  becomes
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1 2 3 4 a ß  y  ö
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
After the elim ination of the v- variables from the goal function we have
1 2 3 4 a ß 7 ö
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1
0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 1 1 1 1 1
Good ß  has the absolutely highest coefficient: uß =  1 and v i =  v2 vA =  -—1. The
vector u =  (0 , 1, 0 , 0) and v =  (-- 1, —1, 0 , —1).
The new vectors become p  == (5, 6 + 1, 6, 9) and q =  (1 — t, 1 — t, 0 , 4 -  t). If we take
t  =  1, wei get the additional tigh t pairs (2, a ), (2, y) and (2,ö)
So, p  = (5, 7, 6, 9) and q -= (0, 0, 0, 3). The value of the  objective function is 30.
Adding the equation for (2, a ), (2,y ) , (2,ö) and its slack variables, we get
1 2 3 4 a ß 7 ö
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
We restore the basis and elim inate the variables p a , pß and p Y and find:
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1 2 3 4 a ß  y  5
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 -1 1 -1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 1 1 2 0 0
Then u =  (—1, 0 , —1, —1) and v = (1, 1, 0 , 0). We get p = 5 1 t, 7, 6 — t, 9 — t) and
q =  (t, t, 0, 3).
We find t  =  1 and (4, a )  and (2, aY) enter T . The new vectors p  and q are: 
p  =  (4, 7, 5, 8) and q =  (1, 1, 0, 3).
We are now in an optim al point as the  next stage would show. One also can come to 
this conclusion from the fact th a t
T  =  {(1, a ß ) , (1,ßY), (2 ,a ) , (2 ,y ), (2,5), (2 ,aY ), (3, 0), (4 ,a ) , (4 ,ß )}  
contains the N  -reallocation ßY ^  1, 5 ^  2, 0 ^ 3  and a  ^  4 w ith to ta l social welfare 
29, equal to  p(Q ) +  q (N ).
If we apply the ‘nucleolus’-m ethod of Section 2 we find for the first nucleolus: 
x  =  (0, 0, f) and y = ( f ,  f ,  ff, f ) .
The vector S is ( ^ ,  | ,  | ) .  We increase W ( N U Q )  t o W ( N U Q )  =  19 +  l l |  =  3 0 |.  
The second nucleolus com putation gives
u = 3i )  and z = (3i  7b 4l  6D-
Furtherm ore, £^ 2 =  55 and th is is lower th an  any of the  z-coordinates. B y Proposi­
tion  5, z is a regular price vector and u =  (1, 2^-, 0, 3^-). The collection T  consists of 
the pairs (1, ßY),  (2, 5), (3, 0) and (4, a )  only. This is the advantage of the ‘nucleolus’- 
m ethod. The collection T  is minimal: w hat is tigh t in the nucleolus, is tigh t in every 
regular price vector. This makes it easier to  decide if there is an N -reallocation in T .
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